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technical boundary of the right to issuance. In a strong dissenting
opinion to the principal case, Judge Haymond attacks this as a
"departure from the doctrine of stare decisis."
Although this is a case of first impression in West Virginia,
there is a clear split of authority throughout the United States concerning the use of the writ to compel a negative act. Compare generally, Brandon v. Adams, 110 Cal. App. 2d 835, 243 P.2d 26
(1952) and Smoker v. Bolin, 85 Ariz. 171, 333 P.2d 977 (1958).
For example, the majority opinion in the principal case refers the
reader to 55 C.J.S. Mandamus § 142 (1948), in support of the majority position, to show the similar use of mandamus in other jurisdictions. However, even a part of the language of that publication
illustrates the diversity of opinion: ". . . the writ will not lie to
compel the striking out of a name . . . where it is the statutory
ministerial duty of the official to include such name .... "
The conclusion to be drawn from the instant case is that the
limitation on the use of the writ of mandamus, not to compel a
negative act, has been broadened through judicial legislation.
James William Sarver

Rules of Civil Procedure - Interposing Counterclaim
- Effect on Venue and Jurisdiction
In an action for a declaratory judgment, P, a Michigan corporation, claimed it was the sole owner of certain patents. D, a resident of Canada, filed a counterclaim, which he thought was compulsory under FED. R. Civ. P. 13(a), with his answer. Later D
filed a motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction over him,
and lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter. The lower court,
Holtzoff, J., held the counterclaim to be permissive under FED. R.
Civ. P. 13(b). By asserting it, D actually invoked the jurisdiction
of the court, thereby waiving any objection to service of process
or jurisdiction of the person. However, the court on its own motion
invoked the doctrine of forum non conveniens. Held, on appeal, that
the doctrine of forum non conveniens was improperly applied. Whether the counterclaim is compulsory or permissive is immaterial, for in
either case D was not compelled to pursue it unless properly served.
FED. R. Civ. P. 12(b) permits challenging the jurisdiction of the
person by a motion made prior to the filing of an answer or counter-
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claim. Even if the counterclaim were compulsory, it did not have
to be asserted immediately, but could wait for the disposition of a
motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction over the person, and not
be lost. If the motion were granted, D would not have to file a
counterclaim; if it were denied, D could have reasserted the objection to service on appeal. If the objection were then sustained,
the interim filing of the counterclaim would not have waived it.
North Branch Products, Inc. v. Fisher, 284 F.2d 611 (D.C. Cir.
1960).
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure should be as favorably
construed as possible "consistent with due recognition of the settled
principle that procedural rules cannot be used to extend federal
jurisdiction or venue." Lesnik v. Public Industrials Corp., 144 F.2d
968, 973 (2d Cir. 1944). In light of W. VA. R.C.P. 82, the West
Virginia courts should be inclined to follow this line of reasoning.
However, as demonstrated by the instant case, some jurisdictional
and venue problems may arise under the new rules.
While there are few federal cases discussing the effect of interposing a counterclaim on the jurisdiction of the person or the
venue of actions, a distinction should be made initially between the
effect of a compulsory counterclaim and a permissive one. Essentially, a compulsory counterclaim under FED. R. Civ. P. 13(a) is one
that is ancillary to the main claim. It is made compulsory in order
that the court may determine in one action all matters related to
the asserted claim, and that such matters may be heard without
independent jurisdictional grounds. On the other hand, a permissive
counterclaim is not ancillary to the main claim; it is unconnected
with the transaction out of which the asserted claim arises, and
requires independent grounds of jurisdiction.
Unlike the federal courts, most West Virginia courts are courts
of general jurisdiction. Thus there will be no problem as to independent jurisdictional grounds. However, there may be problems
in this area concerning jurisdiction of the person. It is settled law
in West Virginia that personal jurisdiction may be obtained by the
consent of the parties, and that lack of such jurisdiction may be
waived. Sidney C. Smith Corp. v. Dailey, 136 W. Va. 380, 67
S.E.2d 523 (1951). Following this rule, it is possible that the
courts will apply the law of the instant case and hold that the assertion of a counterclaim, permissive or compulsory, may constitute
a waiver of any objection to personal jurisdiction.
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The holding of the instant case is supported by Beaunit Mills,
Inc. v. Industrias Reunidas F. Matarazzo, S.A., 23 F.R.D. 654
(S.D.N.Y. 1959). There the complaint was for damages for breach
of contract. The defendant asserted the defenses of lack of personal
jurisdiction and improper venue, and filed a counterclaim for damages resulting from the plaintiff's fraudulent inducement of the defendant to enter into the same contract. It was held that it made
no difference whether the counterclaim interposed was permissive
or compulsory. The defendant waived these defenses by joining
them in his answer with a counterclaim thereby affirmatively invoking the jurisdiction of the court. As in the instant case, the
f '-ry of this ruling is that the defendant could have raised his
objections to personal jurisdiction and venue by a motion under
FED. R. Crv. P. 12(b). By so raising the defenses before assertion
of his counterclaim, he could avoid waiver of these defenses. The
court further reasons that a hearing could be held on these motions
before the answer is filed. If the court, in its sound discretion,
refuses to determine these issues pre-trial, the assertion of a compulsory counterclaim would not be a voluntary submission to the
jurisdiction of the court. Thus the defenses, seasonably raised before the assertion of the counterclaim, would be preserved.
Two distinctions should be noted between the Beaunit
Mills,
Inc. case, supra, and the instant case. In the former, the counterclaim was filed with the answer setting forth the defenses of improper venue and lack of personal jurisdiction. In the latter, a
motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction was made months
after the counterclaim was filed. Also the Beaunit Mills, Inc. case,
supra, concerned both personal jurisdiction and venue, while the
instant case was dealing only with personal jurisdiction. These facts
taken together make the former case much stronger than the latter.
Another view of the personal jurisdiction problem is set forth
in Keil Lock Co., Inc. v. Earle Hardware Mfg. Co., 16
F.R.D. 388 (S.D.N.Y. 1954), an action for damages for patent
infringement. The defendant's answer contained defenses on the
merits, a counterclaim, and a defense of lack of personal jurisdiction. The court, in determining the defense of want of jurisdiction raised by the answer in favor of the defendant before the trial,
stated that this defense was not waived because it was joined with
a counterclaim. FED. R. Civ. P. 12(b) expressly provides that every
available defense, including a counterclaim, shall be asserted in a
responsive pleading, and that no objection or defense is waived by
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Waiver of venue may also be a problem, as shown by the
Beaunit Mills, Inc. case, supra. It has been held that the filing of
a compulsory counterclaim does not constitute waiver of venue,
while there is such a waiver if a permissive counterclaim is filed.
Baltimore & 0. Ry. Co. v. Thompson, 80 F. Supp. 570 (E.D. Mo.
1948).
In discussing the effect on venue and personal jurisdiction of
interposing a permissive or compulsory counterclaim, Professor
Moore takes a view that seems to follow the spirit of the rules.
He states that pleading jurisdiction, venue, and an answer to the
merits and counterclaims or cross-claims together does not amount
to waiver of the defenses of jurisdiction and venue. However the
defendant may, if he chooses, present the defenses under FED. R.
Civ. P. 12(b) by a motion prior to the filing of the answer; any
or all of these defenses must be contained in one motion, not in a

series of motions. 2 MooRE, FEDERAL PRACTICE 2260 (2d ed.
1948). Thus, while some courts compel the defendant to file a
motion prior to his answer or lose his defenses of lack of jurisdiction and venue, Professor Moore accords the defendant a more
liberal course of action.
As seen by the federal cases, a defendant, by interposing
either a permissive or a compulsory counterclaim, may affect his
defenses of lack of personal jurisdiction and venue. This problem
may well arise under the new West Virginia Rules of Civil Procedure; if and when it does, the courts will be at liberty to follow
any of the holdings of the federal courts. In view of the fact that
the rules should be liberally construed to permit justice, perhaps
the liberal interpretation of Professor Moore should be followed.
However, the careful lawyer will probably prefer to act in a more
conservative manner and proceed by motion under W. VA. R.C.P.
12(b) in order to prevent judicial determination of this problem
in favor of his opposing counsel.

Frederick Luther Davis, I.
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